Article 113 of the Indian Constitution is a pivotal provision within the framework of parliamentary control over public finance. It lays down the procedure that must be followed in both Houses of Parliament when dealing with the estimates of expenditure presented by the government as part of the Annual Financial Statement (commonly known as the Union Budget). This article ensures that parliamentary scrutiny is applied to government spending proposals before funds are appropriated.
The article differentiates between two types of expenditure estimates and prescribes distinct procedures for their consideration in Parliament, thus establishing the principle of parliamentary oversight while also recognising certain expenditures as non-votable.
Original Text
113. Procedure in Parliament with respect to estimates.—
(1) So much of the estimates as relates to expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India shall not be submitted to the vote of Parliament, but nothing in this clause shall be construed as preventing the discussion in either House of Parliament of any of those estimates.
(2) So much of the said estimates as relates to other expenditure shall be submitted in the form of demands for grants to the House of the People, and the House of the People shall have power to assent, or to refuse to assent, to any demand, or to assent to any demand subject to a reduction of the amount specified therein.
(3) No demand for a grant shall be made except on the recommendation of the President.
Detailed Explanation
Article 113 meticulously outlines the process for dealing with the expenditure side of the Union Budget within Parliament. It essentially divides the estimates of expenditure into two categories and specifies how each is to be handled.
The first category, covered under Clause (1), relates to “expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India”. These are certain items of expenditure that are specified in Article 112(3) of the Constitution. Such expenditures are not subject to the vote of Parliament. This means that Parliament, while it can discuss these estimates, cannot vote to approve, reject, or reduce them. This provision ensures the stability and continuity of essential government functions and constitutional offices whose expenditures are deemed mandatory and outside the purview of annual parliamentary approval through voting. Examples include the emoluments of the President, the salaries and allowances of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha, the Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, salaries, allowances, and pensions of Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, salaries and allowances of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, and debt charges for which the Government of India is liable. However, Clause (1) explicitly permits discussion on these charged expenditures in both the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. This allows Parliament to scrutinise the necessity and quantum of such spending, even though it cannot alter the amount through a vote.
The second category, dealt with in Clause (2), comprises “other expenditure”. These are all estimates of expenditure presented in the budget that are not charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India. Such estimates are presented to the House of the People (Lok Sabha) in the form of “demands for grants”. Each ministry or department usually presents separate demands for grants for its proposed expenditure. The Lok Sabha holds significant power regarding these demands. It has the authority to assent to a demand (approve it), refuse to assent to a demand (reject it), or assent to a demand subject to a reduction in the amount requested. This is the stage where parliamentary control over most government spending is exercised through voting. The Rajya Sabha can discuss these demands but cannot vote on them.
Clause (3) introduces a crucial procedural safeguard: “No demand for a grant shall be made except on the recommendation of the President.” This means that the initiative for proposing expenditure estimates lies solely with the executive (represented by the President). A demand for a grant cannot be moved or discussed in Parliament without the prior recommendation of the President. This aligns with the principle that financial proposals, especially regarding expenditure, originate from the government.
In essence, Article 113 distinguishes between expenditures that are mandatory and non-votable (charged) and those that are subject to parliamentary approval through voting (other expenditures, presented as demands for grants). It vests the power to vote on demands for grants exclusively with the Lok Sabha, reflecting its position as the directly elected House representative of the people, while allowing discussion on all estimates in both Houses.
Detailed Notes
- Article 113 deals with the procedure in Parliament regarding the estimates of expenditure presented as part of the Annual Financial Statement (Budget).
- It divides expenditure estimates into two categories:
- Expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India.
- Other expenditure.
- Clause (1): Expenditure Charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India
- These estimates are not submitted to the vote of Parliament.
- Parliament cannot approve, reject, or reduce these amounts through voting.
- Examples include salaries/allowances of the President, Supreme Court/High Court Judges, CAG, etc.
- However, discussion on these estimates is permitted in either House of Parliament (Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha).
- Discussion allows scrutiny but not alteration by vote.
- Clause (2): Other Expenditure
- These estimates are submitted to the House of the People (Lok Sabha).
- They are presented in the form of demands for grants.
- The Lok Sabha has the power to:
- Assent to any demand (approve it).
- Refuse to assent to any demand (reject it).
- Assent to any demand subject to a reduction of the amount specified therein (reduce the amount).
- This is the stage where voting on expenditure proposals occurs, primarily in the Lok Sabha.
- Rajya Sabha can discuss these demands but cannot vote on them.
- Clause (3): Recommendation of the President
- No demand for a grant (relating to ‘other expenditure’) can be made in Parliament without the recommendation of the President.
- This ensures that expenditure proposals originate from the executive.
- Article 113 is part of the legislative financial procedure following the presentation of the Annual Financial Statement (Article 112) and precedes the passage of the Appropriation Bill (Article 114).
- It highlights the Lok Sabha’s primacy in controlling the government’s purse regarding most expenditures.
Additional Comments
- The distinction between charged and votable expenditure is a key feature of India’s financial procedure, borrowed from the British system. Its purpose is to insulate certain essential expenses from political fluctuations and ensure the independence or smooth functioning of specific offices/institutions.
- The discussion on charged expenditure, despite being non-votable, provides a valuable opportunity for Parliament to examine the underlying policies and efficiency of the bodies whose expenses are charged on the CFI.
- The discussion and voting on demands for grants in the Lok Sabha is a critical part of the budget process. It is during this stage that cut motions (like policy cut, economy cut, token cut) can be moved by members to reduce the amounts requested by the government, serving as tools for parliamentary control and criticism of executive policies.
- After the demands for grants are voted upon (or deemed passed after a certain period), the amounts granted, along with the charged expenditure, are consolidated into an Appropriation Bill (Article 114). The passage of the Appropriation Bill is constitutionally required before any money can be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund of India to meet these expenditures.
- Article 113 focuses only on expenditure estimates. The revenue side of the budget is handled separately, primarily through Finance Bills (Article 117).
Summary
Article 113 of the Indian Constitution governs how Parliament processes the expenditure estimates presented in the Union Budget. It specifies that estimates for expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India are open for discussion in both Houses but are not subject to a vote. Conversely, estimates for all other expenditures are presented as demands for grants exclusively to the Lok Sabha, which has the power to approve, reject, or reduce these demands through voting. Furthermore, no demand for a grant can be made without the prior recommendation of the President, ensuring executive initiative in financial proposals. This article underscores the Lok Sabha’s dominant role in controlling government spending through the voting process on demands for grants.