Article 31C is a crucial provision within Part III of the Indian Constitution, dealing with Fundamental Rights. It represents a significant attempt by the legislature to prioritize the implementation of certain Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSPs) over specific Fundamental Rights. Its insertion and subsequent judicial interpretations have been central to the debate on the relationship between Fundamental Rights and DPSPs.
This article was introduced during a period when the government sought to implement socialist policies aimed at reducing economic disparities. It aimed to provide constitutional immunity to laws enacted for achieving the objectives laid down in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39, which deal with the distribution of material resources and the prevention of concentration of wealth.
Original Text
As inserted by the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971:
31C. Saving of laws giving effect to certain directive principles.—Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing—
(a) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good; or (b) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment;
shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14 or article 19; and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it does not give effect to such policy:
Provided that where such law is made by the Legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent.
Note: Article 31 was repealed by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978. Clause (a) and (b) within the original text above refer to clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 respectively.
Detailed Explanation
Article 31C was enacted by the 25th Amendment Act, 1971, primarily to overcome the difficulties faced in implementing land reforms and nationalization policies due to challenges based on Fundamental Rights, particularly the right to property (Article 31), equality (Article 14), and freedom (Article 19).
The article states that laws enacted to implement the principles specified in Article 39(b) and Article 39(c) cannot be challenged on the grounds that they violate Article 14 (Equality before law) or Article 19 (Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.). This provides a protective shield to such laws, granting them precedence over these specific Fundamental Rights.
The original Article 31C had two main parts:
- Immunity Clause: It protected laws aimed at securing the objectives of Article 39(b) and (c) from being challenged on the basis of violation of Article 14, Article 19, and (originally) Article 31.
- Declaration Clause: It stated that if a law contained a declaration that it was for giving effect to the principles in Article 39(b) and (c), this declaration could not be questioned in any court. This meant that once the legislature declared a law was for this purpose, courts could not review whether it actually served that purpose.
The Declaration Clause (the second part of the original text) was challenged in the landmark case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973). The Supreme Court, while upholding the first part (the immunity clause, albeit without Article 31 after its repeal), struck down the second part (the declaration clause) as unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that this clause ousted judicial review, which is a fundamental aspect of the Basic Structure of the Constitution. Thus, while laws implementing Article 39(b) and (c) are protected from challenges under Articles 14 and 19, courts can still examine whether such a law genuinely aims to achieve the principles laid down in Article 39(b) or (c).
The 42nd Amendment Act, 1976, attempted to expand the scope of Article 31C significantly. It proposed to protect laws giving effect to any of the Directive Principles enumerated in Part IV from challenge under Articles 14 and 19. This expanded version was challenged in the Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) case. The Supreme Court held this expanded scope of Article 31C (inserted by the 42nd Amendment) unconstitutional, again on the grounds that it violated the Basic Structure doctrine. The Court reaffirmed that the balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles is an essential feature of the Constitution, and giving absolute primacy to all DPSPs over Articles 14 and 19 would upset this balance.
As a result of these judgments, the current position of Article 31C is as per the original 25th Amendment, but with the second part (declaration clause) struck down, and Article 31 removed from the list of protected rights. It saves laws giving effect only to Article 39(b) and Article 39(c) from being challenged under Article 14 and Article 19, and the justiciability of whether the law relates to 39(b) or 39(c) is maintained.
The proviso to Article 31C requires that if a State Legislature makes such a law, it must be reserved for the consideration of the President and receive his assent to get the protection of Article 31C. This is to ensure uniformity and central scrutiny of state laws seeking this special protection.
Detailed Notes
- Insertion: Inserted by the Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971.
- Purpose: To protect laws implementing specific Directive Principles (Article 39(b) and 39(c)) from judicial review based on violation of certain Fundamental Rights.
- Protected Principles (DPSPs):
- Article 39(b): Ownership and control of material resources distributed to subserve the common good.
- Article 39(c): Operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment.
- Overriding Effect: Begins with a non-obstante clause: “Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13…” This signifies its dominance over Article 13 (which states laws inconsistent with FRs are void).
- Protected Fundamental Rights (FRs):
- Article 14 (Equality before law and equal protection of laws).
- Article 19 (Protection of six rights regarding freedom).
- Originally included Article 31 (Right to Property), but it was repealed by the 44th Amendment Act, 1978.
- Judicial Review of Purpose:
- The original article contained a clause that declared a law containing a declaration of its purpose (giving effect to 39(b)/(c)) could not be questioned in court.
- In Kesavananda Bharati case (1973), the Supreme Court struck down this ‘declaration clause’ as unconstitutional, holding it violated the Basic Structure (specifically, judicial review).
- Courts retain the power to examine whether a law claiming protection under Article 31C actually relates to and seeks to implement Article 39(b) or 39(c).
- Relationship with Basic Structure: Article 31C is a key provision interpreted through the lens of the Basic Structure Doctrine. The court attempts to balance the goals of socio-economic justice (DPSPs) with the protection of individual liberties (FRs) and the principle of judicial review.
- Attempted Expansion (42nd Amendment): The 42nd Amendment Act, 1976, sought to extend the protection of Article 31C to laws implementing any of the DPSPs listed in Part IV.
- Invalidation of Expansion (Minerva Mills): In Minerva Mills case (1980), the Supreme Court declared this expanded version of Article 31C (by 42nd Amendment) unconstitutional, stating it gave absolute primacy to DPSPs over FRs (Articles 14 & 19), which violates the Basic Structure.
- Current Scope: Article 31C, as it stands today after judicial interpretation, protects laws implementing only Article 39(b) and 39(c) from challenge under Articles 14 and 19, subject to judicial review of whether the law genuinely serves the purpose of Article 39(b) or (c).
- Proviso for State Laws: State laws seeking protection under Article 31C must be reserved for the President’s consideration and receive Presidential assent.
Additional Comments
- Article 31C is a prime example of the constitutional struggle between the legislature and the judiciary, particularly regarding the hierarchy and relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles.
- The judicial interpretation of Article 31C, especially in Kesavananda Bharati and Minerva Mills cases, solidified the Basic Structure doctrine and reinforced the role of judicial review as a guardian of the Constitution.
- The Kesavananda Bharati judgment, by striking down the declaration clause, ensured that the mere declaration by the legislature is not sufficient to immunize a law; its nexus with Article 39(b) or (c) is subject to judicial scrutiny.
- The Minerva Mills judgment prevented the wholesale subordination of Fundamental Rights (specifically 14 and 19) to all Directive Principles, maintaining a balance and upholding the significance of these rights.
- Article 31C remains a significant provision allowing the State to implement policies aimed at economic justice (related to distribution of wealth and resources) without facing challenges under equality and freedom rights, provided the law genuinely serves this purpose and respects other aspects of the Basic Structure.
Summary
Article 31C, inserted by the 25th Amendment, provides that laws enacted to give effect to the Directive Principles in Article 39(b) and 39(c) shall not be void if they are inconsistent with or abridge the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19. While the original provision sought to make the legislature’s declaration regarding the law’s purpose unquestionable, the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati struck down this non-justiciability clause, retaining the judiciary’s power to review if the law genuinely serves the stated DPSP purpose. The attempt by the 42nd Amendment to extend this protection to all DPSPs was invalidated in Minerva Mills. Consequently, Article 31C currently protects laws related only to Article 39(b) and (c) from challenges under Articles 14 and 19, subject to judicial review of the law’s connection to these DPSPs. State laws seeking this protection require Presidential assent.